A Mutiny Grows in Punjab by Anatol Lieven: A Comment from Peshawar
(It was written sometime back)
Prof.
Ijaz Khan
Department
of International Relations
University
of Peshawar
Sometimes
even (partially) correct factual description of a situation may lead to
interpretations and policy recommendations not really warranted by it. Anatol
Lieven in his book ‘Pakistan: A Hard Country’ has done precisely that. He
builds on his arguments in his essay titled ‘A Mutiny Grows in Punjab’. His arguments
and policy recommendations can be summarized as
- 1. Afghanistan and Pakistan do not represent one strategic area as portrayed by the term Af–Pak.
- 2. Winning in Afghanistan is not of vital interest to USA
- 3. Return of Taliban rule to Afghanistan, especially to southern Afghanistan (thus also hinting at division of Afghanistan) under whatever name and form will have no negative implications for US interests
- 4. The insurgency in FATA or its use as safe havens by extremists/ terrorists is also of much less significance than current US policy gives it.
- 5. By implications the US focus on the North West of Pakistan (FATA Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan) is at best not worth the importance given to it.
- 6. The real issue is the growing religious extremist threat to Pakistani State which comes from Punjab
- 7. Democracy is against the genesis of the people and society of Pakistan.
- 8. US must support status-quo, which means military controlled (directly or indirectly) Pakistan.
- 9. Pakistan must not be pressurized towards democratization or for more real action against extremists/ terrorists as that will weaken Pakistani State.
1. So,
by implications, the elimination of extremists/ terrorists is not possible
either through direct US action or through Pakistani state, so US policy need
not aim at it.
The strategic connection between the situation
in Afghanistan and Pakistan is not separable. At the same time relationship
between the two states is such that road to one cannot go through another. Policy
must aim at both as one strategic area. Which means one must avoid focusing on
one and expecting or pushing the other to follow suit or go its own way. Policy
towards one must be cognizant of the situation in the other.
Historically
speaking, the United States considered the slipping of Afghanistan into the
Soviet camp in the 1950s as acceptable.
Repeated pleas by the then Afghan government for support were ignored.
The US tried to convince Afghanistan to mend its ways with Pakistan. The US
policy after failing to woo India into the ‘containment policy’ considered
Pakistan’s geo strategic location to be of real consequence and Afghanistan to
be expandable. To be fair, Afghanistan also refused to be part of the system of
alliances, US was building around Soviet Union in the early days of the Cold War.
The US did attempt to bring Afghanistan into its web of alliances, but that
attempt hinged on Afghanistan’s mending its differences with Pakistan, and
giving up of Afghanistan’s traditional non aligned policy, both of which were
not acceptable to Afghanistan. US also readily accepted Afghanistan as largely
within the Soviet sphere of influence and considered Pakistan being a part of
its alliance system to be a better bargain. The consequences of that policy are
well documented. Soviet intervention into
Afghanistan, the US sponsored Jihad against that and the subsequent Soviet
withdrawal and collapse, followed by abandoning of Afghanistan and the rise of
Taliban, its becoming a hub of terrorists from the around the World, more
significantly Al Qaeda, 9/11 and today the global terrorism need not to be
detailed or discussed here. However, two points must be emphasized, one, both
the Soviet intervention and the rise of Taliban/ concentration of Al Qaeda in
Afghanistan, were a direct consequence of a strategic assessment of Afghanistan
which gave it less priority and two, Religious extremists that were tools of
Pakistan’s Policy (those tools also fitted well in US policy towards Soviet
Union) now became partners in policy making with aspirations to control policy
making and ultimately the state of Pakistan. The problem with Pakistan is that
Pakistani policy is directed towards scaling them down from their partnership
status and hitting at their aspirations to control, however, not to eliminate
them as it still wants them back as tools of policy.
Further
he misses the whole point when he separates the problem in Afghanistan from
that in Pakistan or for that matter in Punjab, which he correctly identifies as
the real locale of the threat rather than FATA. A policy that aims at
stabilizing the situation in Pakistan and letting Afghanistan go its own way is
not based on a sound understanding of the ground realities. Basing policy on
promises and assurances, even at the highest levels, of eliminating Al Qaeda
from Afghanistan and containing Taliban to Afghanistan only will be policy
based on a rather flawed understanding of behavior of States and an
understanding of Pakistani state which ignores an interptretation of Pakistan’s
policy also presented by the Anatol Lieven himself, when he informs against
expecting Pakistan to act against Afghan Taliban as that is not in conformity
with its (Pakistan’s) ‘Strategic Calculations’. A Taliban victory in
Afghanistan will strengthen the forces of ‘Mutiny in Punjab’ to a level and
pitch that no level of US support for the Pakistani state will be able to
contain it, short of a US direct intervention. A probability that, in the
considered opinion of this writer, will yield much worse results for US
interests as well as Pakistani stability than the current situation in
Afghanistan or Pakistan. Such a scenario may spill over into other regional
states, especially India. It will be a nightmare by comparison to what is
happening today. Abandoning Afghanistan will give such a strong message to the
extremists every where including the mutineers of Punjab and trust in their
capability that containing them may require a more brutal action than currently
being taken by Libyan state forces against people. More importantly, will
Pakistan army take such a action? There should be no doubts that it will not.
Anatol
Lieven makes another contradictory argument. While he correctly identifies
Pakistan with Punjab, he contradicts himself when he asserts that there is more
sympathy to Taliban amongst Pashtuns than Punjabis as he throughout correctly
identifies the extremists in Punjab to be the real threat. By extension he
argues that along with Afghanistan, Pashtuns of Pakistan are also of less
significance for US interests. It must be understood that Pashtun territory is
being used by extremists from around the world, most of them from Punjab, with
Pashtuns as foot soldiers. So, the level of sympathy with Taliban has been
presented as much exaggerated.
The
problem in Pashtun territories especially in Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA) is a result of combination of the undemocratic growth of the
Pakistani State and its strategic calculations. The reason for the ability of
extremists to use Pashtun territory is lack of (more than bad) governance
there. So, rather than accepting and dealing with Pakistan as Punjab, a fact
directly responsible for Pakistan’s strategic calculations vis a vis India and
use of religious extremists as policy tools, this needs to be identified as the
basic problem.
In
a nutshell Anatol Lieven argues for preserving the Pakistani State in its
current political administrative make up in total disregard to the mind set
that it generates and is in turn protected by it and the resultant security
policies. Expecting such a State to be able to contain the terrorist threat
that emanates from its territory is a self contradictory assertion. This comment argues that; one the ‘War
against Terrorism’ is in the whole of Af–Pak territory and as such it will be
lost or won in the whole of the territory; the need for a stable and secure
Pakistan is in every one’s interest, including the United States; how it can be
guaranteed needs more serious thought than just preserving the status quo,
which is becoming more and more un sustainable. This comment concludes that
unless a fundamental re appraisal by Pakistan’s of its self identity, the World
view based on it, which gives a certain color to its threat perceptions and
security paradigm which in turn influences the tools, allies and methods it
selects for its security, is carried out, situation in the region will
continuously deteriorate. The threat of terrorism that emanates from Pakistan
(Read Punjab) has been correctly identified to be real and long term; however,
the means to contain it appears to be not just unsustainable but counter
productive. The terrorist threat from it is a consequence of the status quo and
so cannot even be restricted it, its elimination by the status quo is simply
not possible. Rather in order to maintain status quo, Pakistan will
continuously drift towards more religousization/Talibanization.
Punajbization
of Pakistan has resulted in Talibanization/religiousization of Pakistan’s
security paradigm The US policy must aim at a strong democratic, federal Pakistan,
with a plural multi national identity reflected in its decision making and
power structure, which is only possible through sustenance of internal
democratic process and improved governance, which will lead to a re assessment
of self and surrounding. US cannot abandon Afghanistan or the region, through
some face saving formula. It has to leave, but after securing it enough for
Afghan State to be able to continue its stability and democratizing process on
its own. That is needed not just because Afghanistan is important in its own
right but also for the whole region, especially Pakistan. Finally, there are no
quick fix solutions. Any attempts or policy aiming at quick fix solutions will
be self defeating and will result in much worse intermediate term conditions.
Deprivation in the parts, East & West of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province that is southern Panjab and FATA the undemocratic growth of a terrible Political Culture are responsible for the current and coming unforeseen fiasco.
ReplyDeleteProfessor Ejaz Sahib. I must say an excellent analysis of the situation and an apt rejoinder to Levin. You hit the final nail by highlighting the maintaining the 'Status-Quo' in Pakistan is not an option as it will continue generating more and more terrorist threats to the region and the world at large.
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