There is No Insurgency in FATA - The Whole Article

(This write up appeared in 'The Friday Times' Lahore in three parts, on 17, 24 and 31 January 2014. The author (that's me) consider it needs to be read as one whole. So, has taken the liberty to share the whole write up in one go)
There is no insurgency in FATA – I   - 17 Jan 2014

There is no insurgency in FATA – II  - 24 Jan 2014

There is no insurgency in FATA – III - 31 Jan 2014There is No Insurgency in FATA

Prof. Ijaz Khan

Dept of International Relations

University of Peshawar

There is a continuous talk of an insurgency in FATA and the need to Counter Insurgency (COIN) action there since at least 2003-4. In 2004, Pakistan Army moved into FATA for COIN operations.  Experts and others interested have strong opinion about how to end insurgency in FATA restore ‘writ of the State’ there.

One plans and acts according to the problem or challenge one is facing. Like a doctor can only prescribe correct medicine if s/he diagnoses the disease correctly, decision makers must first correctly identify the problem, its level, intensity and location, assess their own capabilities and take a decision accordingly. The debate revolves around a situation in FATA and more specifically in the two agencies, North and South Waziristan. That situation is termed as insurgency and experts and others interested give opinion on how to deal with it, suggesting various counter insurgency policies and actions. The contention of this scribe is the situation in Waziristan and rest of FATA is not that of insurgency. This mistake in identifying the situation has resulted in counterproductive policies and actions.

Taliban and Pashtun Identity

Taliban and Pashtun identity
originally published in 'The Friday Times' in January 2012 is no more available in its archives, however, LUBP an online group had re published it and is there. you can read it there or here too

Nationalist movements promote and protect national language, culture and identity through political expression. They aim to control their affairs without outside interference. They are about managing their economic resources by themselves. They may want autonomy within a multinational state in order to structure it to protect their identity, or in certain cases for an independent state of their own.

Taliban meet none of these criteria in Afghanistan or Pakistan, and therefore cannot be considered a Pashtun nationalist movement. They take ideological and political inspiration from Arabs and other non-Pashtuns. They have consciously, as a matter of policy, targeted different cultural traits of Pashtuns, like tribal councils and folk music; they are not concerned about the language and promote mostly Arabic and/or interestingly, Urdu; Economic resources or their control is not their concern; neither is any political or administrative manifestation of Pashtun identity their goal.

For more click below

About FATA - My write up published by NBR, USA

Development Challenges in FATA
Prof. Ijaz Khan

This essay addresses the challenges facing development in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), a special administrative region enjoying vast internal autonomy with minimal state oversight. Due to the area’s special constitutional status, isolation, and proximity to and shared ethnicity with Afghanistan, the FATA has become a safe haven for extremists and terrorists following the overthrow of the Taliban government in Afghanistan in 2001. As a result, the region is now the focus of international concern and the center of the war on terrorism.

With U.S. support and prodding, the Pakistani government has initiated a comprehensive three-pronged political, military, and developmental strategy to break the FATA’s isolation and rid the area of militancy. Focusing on the developmental element of that strategy, this study finds that the government’s policies are not geared to achieve any of the fundamental changes required for meaningful development of the region. Furthermore, Pakistan’s ambivalent posture toward the war on terrorism has gradually undermined Islamabad’s ability even to pursue successful development projects.

This essay begins with a brief summary of the current political-administrative structure of the FATA. It then identifies Pakistan’s strategy for developing the FATA— noting earlier government attempts to develop the area, especially those made during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government (December 1971–April 1977). The next section discusses the FATA’s evolving socio-economic landscape and power structure and points to the futility of the Pakistani government’s reliance on outdated political-administrative structures in light of these changes. Focusing on the deleterious impact of militancy on development initiatives, the essay then examines the rise of militancy in the FATA. The essay concludes by discussing the Pakistani government’s current inability to bring effective change to the region.

For further reading go to http://nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=145#.UxMUQ_mSySo